Continuous Variable Quantum Cryptography: Beating the 3 dB Loss Limit

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We demonstrate that secure quantum key distribution systems based on continuous variable implementations can operate beyond the apparent 3 dB loss limit that is implied by the beam splitting attack. The loss limit was established for standard minimum uncertainty states such as coherent states. We show that, by an appropriate postselection mechanism, we can enter a region where Eve's knowledge on Alice's key falls behind the information shared between Alice and Bob, even in the presence of substantial losses.

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The distribution of random keys for cryptographic purposes can be made secure by using the fundamental properties of quantum systems such that any interception of the key information can be detected. This was first discussed for discrete systems [1], and experimental demonstrations have been carried out using optical sources, which produce low photon number states [2]. More recently, schemes based on continuous quantum variables have been proposed [3-6], where the scheme by Gottesman and Preskill [4] has been proven to be information-theoretically secure. Apart from being of fundamental interest, these schemes offer certain practical advantages. However, they all share one major disadvantage: currently it is thought that the use of continuous variable techniques does not allow quantum key distribution (QKD) beyond 50% loss [6]. This severely limits the applicability of such schemes.

The argument leading to this limit is based on an optimal cloning approach for optical signals that corresponds to a beam splitting attack on the signals [6]. At the loss limit, an eavesdropper Eve can replace the lossy channel by a perfect one with an adapted beam splitter to mimic the losses. She can then generate a cloned signal with a fidelity which depends on the beam splitter transmission. In order to extract a secure key out of the material with the usual privacy amplification tools [7] and a free choice of the required error correction technique, including the efficient two-way schemes [8], however, the mutual information I_{AB} between Alice and Bob has to exceed the information that either of them shares with Eve: $I_{AB} > \max\{I_{AE}, I_{EB}\}$. This condition arises as follows: In order to perform privacy amplification [7], one needs to be able to estimate Eve's information on the data shared by Alice and Bob after error correction. Two-way error correction provides additional information to Eve in two forms: redundant information to enable error correction, that are according to Shannon's theorem at least 1 - I_{AB} bits, and information about the positions of bits where Alice's and Bob's data initially differ. In the worst case, the two-way error correction scheme leaks the complete information about these error positions to Eve, so that Eve's information about Alice's and Bob's key now stands on the same footing and satisfies $I'_{(AB)E} \ge \max\{I_{AE}, I_{EB}\}$. In the protocol presented below, we actually find equality, as explained later. Taking this into account, the usual mechanism of one-way communication schemes applies, and we find for individual attacks via [7,9,10,11] the condition $I_{AB} > \max\{I_{AE}, I_{EB}\}$. (Following discussions with Grangier, it should be pointed out that specific two-way error correction techniques might leak less information about error positions leading to less demanding conditions.) Yet, for losses beyond 50%, one finds that the condition $I_{AB} > I_{AE}$ is violated so that the above standard methods cannot be used without advanced quantum technologies such as quantum memories and entanglement purification which are presently not available. Note that one may restrict the information flow for error correction from Bob to Alice or vice versa. In this case, the "maximum" in the above case may safely replaced by the "minimum" [9,12], but efficient protocols for one-way error correction close to the Shannon limit for typical error rates around 5% are still missing up to now.

In this Letter we propose a novel scheme, which operates beyond the apparent 3 dB limit. In certain situations it is still possible to create a secure key [7], although $I_{AB} < I_{AE}$ or even $I_{AB} < I_{BE}$. For classical correlations the procedure is known as advantage distillation [10]; upon closer investigation, this turns out to be a form of postselection and requires two-way classical communication. Gottesman and Lo [13] used this technique to increase the tolerance against errors in the single-photon BB84 protocol. Postselection is a standard intrinsic procedure in conventional QKD with weak pulses: if no photon is detected by Bob, or when Alice and Bob did not measure in the same basis, the corresponding time slot is ignored and hence does not contribute to the raw data. Without this postselection, the condition $I_{AB} \ge \max\{I_{AE}, I_{EB}\}$ could never be reached for any QKD protocol for losses beyond 3 dB, because then Eve has access to better signals than Bob. However, postselection allows unconditionally secure key exchange in the presence of large losses, limited basically only by the photodetection process [14]. The situation becomes more subtle for continuous variable schemes, since then always a nonvacuum signal reaches Bob and correlations appear between the data measured by Bob and that of potential eavesdroppers via Alice's state preparation. Thus the postselection has to be made more conscious, and here we show how to do this. The selection of favorable data for Alice and Bob has been previously addressed in the context of implementing the BB84 protocol with weak coherent pulses in the presence of a strong phase reference pulse [15]. Our results demonstrate that continuous variables and weak coherent pulse schemes are closely linked in the basic principles.

We consider the following scheme, which is similar to those proposed by Cerf et al. [5] and Grosshans and Grangier [6]. Alice sends an ensemble of coherent states to Bob with a Gaussian distribution of complex amplitudes centered on the vacuum. Bob measures either of two conjugate quadratures, say, e.g., the in- and out-of-phase quadratures X and Y, using homodyne detection. The measurement results x are then given as eigenvalues of quadrature operator $\hat{x}_{\lambda} = \frac{1}{2}(\hat{a}e^{-i\lambda} + \hat{a}^{\dagger}e^{i\lambda})$ with $\lambda = 0$ or $\frac{\pi}{2}$. Bob will effectively see a Gaussian distribution for both kinds of quadrature measurements X and Y. Bob reveals which quadrature he measured in each time interval and estimates whether Alice prepared a coherent state with a positive or negative displacement in the corresponding quadrature. Alice and Bob can now interpret positive displacements as logical "0" and negative ones as logical "1." For our analysis of the security of this scheme, we extend this protocol and specify the used states by additional steps. After Bob's publication of his choice of the quadrature, Alice will interpret the state she sent either as a member of the set $\{| -\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle, |\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle\}$, if Bob detected the quadrature X, or $\{| -i\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle, |i\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle\}$ $(\alpha \in \mathbb{R})$, if Bob measured the quadrature Y. She now publishes the values of α and θ . In each case, from Bob's and Eve's perspective, this narrows down the number of possible signals to two, for example, $|\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle$ or |- $\alpha e^{-i\theta}$). Thus, Alice and Bob can build up a secret key as before when now the encoding reads more specifically: $|\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle \rightarrow 0$, $|-\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle \rightarrow 1$ for X quadrature measurements and $|i\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle \rightarrow 0$, $|-i\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle \rightarrow 1$ for Y quadrature measurements. Other choices of signal sets are possible, for example, sets with point symmetry, but the choice above turns out to be favorable.

To investigate the secrecy of the key, the distribution of Bob's data conditioned on the choice of Alice can be accessed using classical communication. For this purpose, Alice and Bob open up complete signal descriptions and measurement results for some randomly chosen transmission events. Thus, the statistics of Bob's detected results should mirror Alice's coherent state preparation with expected Gaussian distributions centered according to the complex amplitude displacements.

Eve's first strategy is thus passive intervention via the beam splitter attack [6]. Eve's intervention is indistinguishable from loss. In the typical loss model, Alice's state is transformed as

$$|\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle_B|0\rangle_E \to |\sqrt{\eta}\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle_B|\sqrt{1-\eta}\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle_E \qquad (1)$$

for arbitrary α and θ , where η is the transmission efficiency between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob are none the wiser, but Eve ends up with all the lost signal. It was shown [6] that, provided the loss is less than 50%, it is still possible for Alice and Bob to distill a secure key when faced with such an attack. We will now show that, in fact, 50% loss is not an ultimate limit for secure QKD.

We wish to find a way by which Alice and Bob can postselect a subset of the data for which they have a high mutual information, but for which Eve and Alice do not. Alice and Bob can base their selection procedure on the parameter α and θ characterizing the state preparation and Bob's measurement results x. The overall mutual information of Alice and Bob can then be subdivided into different *effective information channels* characterized by the parameters (α , θ , x), such that

$$I_{AB}^{\text{tot}} = \int_{\alpha,\theta,x} dx d\alpha d\theta p(\alpha,\theta,x) I_{AB}(\alpha,\theta,x).$$
(2)

Similarly, the overall information Alice shares with Eve can be composed from all single events.

Note that the separable nature of the state of Eq. (1) ensures that there is no correlation between Bob's and Eve's quantum uncertainties. Thus, Eve's mutual information with Alice does not depend on Bob's detected outcome x. Furthermore, Eve shares with Bob always less information than with Alice, $I_{BE} < I_{AE}$, and it is sufficient to consider Alice and Eve's information only. Altogether, this allows us to evaluate the knowledge of the different parties separately for all effective information channels and we can restrict our analysis to find suitable parameters (α, θ, x) with $I_{AB}(\alpha, \theta, x) > I_{AE}(\alpha, \theta)$. Since the beam splitting attack and protocol itself are symmetrical in respect to the considered conjugate quadratures, it is also sufficient to investigate only the case of a quadrature measurement X by Bob.

To identify the good effective channels, we calculate the mutual information shared by Alice and Eve. Alice sends *a priori* pure states. However, knowing nothing about Alice's state preparation, Eve would have to distinguish between two allowed mixed states characterized by positive or negative displacements in the respective quadrature. So far no general expression for the accessible information is known for nonorthogonal mixed states. For this reason we provide Eve with the additional information about α and θ . As a tradeoff Eve has to distinguish for each effective channel between two nonorthogonal *pure* states, in the case of X quadrature measurements between $|\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle$ and $|-\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle$. In this situation the maximum accessible information is known. It is given as a function of the overlap f of the respective two states [16] in the form

$$I_{AE} = \frac{1}{2}(1 + \sqrt{1 - f^2})\log(1 + \sqrt{1 - f^2}) + \frac{1}{2}(1 - \sqrt{1 - f^2})\log(1 - \sqrt{1 - f^2}).$$
(3)

For an effective channel with parameters α and θ , the overlap can be calculated as

$$f(\alpha, \theta) = \langle -\alpha\sqrt{1-\eta}e^{-i\theta} \mid \alpha\sqrt{1-\eta}e^{i\theta} \rangle = e^{-2(1-\eta)E^2},$$
(4)

where we defined $E = \alpha \cos(\theta)$. The protocol ensures that the overlap and thus the mutual information of Eve depends only on the effective amplitude *E*. As we see later, the parameters α and θ enter the mutual information of Alice and Bob always in the same combination. This allows us to consider in the following the parameters (E, x) only. At this point, we note that the states between which Eve has to distinguish and their *a priori* probabilities do not change if we give Eve the additional information whether Alice's and Bob's decoded bit differs for a given signal. This kind of information is leaked in twoway error correction. It is for this reason that we can assume equality in the bound $I'_{(AB)E} \ge \max\{I_{AE}, I_{EB}\}$ of Eve's information $I'_{(AB)E}$ on Alice's and Bob's key given the knowledge of all error positions.

Next, we calculate the mutual information of Alice and Bob. According to the protocol, Bob performs quadrature measurements and decodes the bit value as the sign of the detected displacement. Depending on the signal states $|\pm \alpha e^{\pm i\theta}\rangle$, his outcomes *x* are distributed corresponding to one of the probability distributions

$$P(x|| \pm \alpha e^{\pm i\theta}\rangle) = |\langle x_0 | \pm \alpha e^{\pm i\theta}\rangle|^2 = \sqrt{\frac{2}{\pi}} e^{-2(x \mp \sqrt{\eta} E)^2},$$
(5)

with $|x_0\rangle$ as the eigenstate of the quadrature operators with $\lambda = 0$. This decoding leads to an error rate

$$p_e = \begin{cases} \frac{P(x||-\alpha e^{-i\theta}))}{P(||\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle) + P(x||-\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle)} & \text{for } x > 0, \\ \frac{P(x||\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle)}{P(x||\alpha e^{i\theta}\rangle) + P(x||-\alpha e^{-i\theta}\rangle)} & \text{for } x < 0. \end{cases}$$
(6)

Alice's and Bob's mutual information can then be calculated separately for all effective information channels with (x, E) by the Shannon formula,

$$I_{AB}(x, E) = 1 + p_e \log_2 p_e + (1 - p_e) \log_2(1 - p_e).$$
 (7)

We are now in a position to identify those effective information channels with $I_{AB}(x, E) > I_{AE}(x, E)$, which allow one to extract a secret key. Figure 1 displays the differences of the respective information plotted for the events (*E*, *x*) again in the case of 50% loss. Positive valued areas, indicating regions of possible secure key exchange, are colored bright, negative ones in dark. Thus, our investigation allows us to model an ideal postselection procedure, where all events (x, E) with $I_{AB} > \max\{I_{AE}, I_{EB}\}$ actually contribute to the key.

The comparison of Fig. 1 between the mutual information of Alice and Bob and the information they share with Eve displays an insight that was first recognized in [15]. Alice and Bob can actually utilize statistical measurement results with large x to increase their security, but Eve, on the other hand, cannot improve her error rate for Bob's selected data. This is because her state is




FIG. 1. Comparison of the mutual information between Alice and Bob and the information they share with Eve for different state preparations with effective amplitude $E = \cos(\alpha)$ and measured outcomes x of Bob. Positive areas, colored bright, indicate effective information channels that contribute to secure key exchange since they satisfy $I_{AB}(x, E) > I_{AE}(x, E)$.

uncorrelated to Bob's results x. Furthermore, there exist for each transmission η an optimum effective displacement E, such that the mutual information between Alice and Bob is maximized.

We can evaluate the key rates R_k that can be achieved in the presented postselection process as

$$R_k = R_r \times \int_S dx dE p(x, E) [I_{AB}(x, E) - I_{AE}(x, E)], \quad (8)$$

where R_r is the raw data rate, and S denotes the subset of selected effective channels. For the presented protocol, the probability p(x, E) that the effective channel is used is composed of Gaussian distribution of width d of the effective amplitude E and the distribution of x conditioned on E. Thus, we find

$$p(x, E) = \sqrt{\frac{2}{d\pi}} e^{-2(E^2/d)} \frac{1}{2} (P(x||\alpha e^{i\theta})) + P(x|| - \alpha e^{-i\theta})),$$
(9)

with $P(x|| \pm \alpha e^{i\theta})$ given in Eq. (5). First numerical calculations, where we limited our integration over the data set within ± 4 , indicate that, in the presence of 50% loss and for an optimized parameter of d = 2.1, bit rates up to $R_k = R_r \times 0.0667$ are achievable. For a loss rate of 75%, we have found a key rate of $R_k = R_r \times 0.0073$. These calculations show that the high repetition rates of continuous variable technology, which is expected to be in the GHz region, can actually lead to secure key rates that are well above currently implemented schemes.

We have shown that continuous variable QKD using coherent states in the presence of losses above 50% can still be implemented securely against an eavesdropper using an individual beam splitter attack. The postselection process solely relies on classical data processing and thus does not require sophisticated quantum resources other than coherent states. Hence, our result pushes continuous variable QKD closer to practical applications. The existence of optimum effective displacements for the mutual information between Alice and Bob opens the possibility to construct more elaborated protocols with modified probability distributions for Alice's state preparation to achieve higher bit rates, if one ensures that the beam splitting attack remains the best eavesdropping strategy. An absolute proof of security would require the analysis of a more general attack by Eve. However, it is likely that the beam splitting attack is the optimal attack even in this protocol utilizing postselection.

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